Probabilities in the logic of quantum propositions by Bolotin, Arkady
ar
X
iv
:1
81
2.
01
93
7v
2 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
24
 Ja
n 2
01
9
Probabilities in the logic of quantum propositions
Arkady Bolotin∗
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beersheba (Israel)
January 25, 2019
Abstract
In quantum logic, i.e., within the structure of the Hilbert lattice imposed on all closed linear
subspaces of a Hilbert space, the assignment of truth values to quantum propositions (i.e., ex-
perimentally verifiable propositions relating to a quantum system) is unambiguously determined
by the state of the system. So, if only pure states of the system are considered, can a proba-
bility measure mapping the probability space for truth values to the unit interval be assigned
to quantum propositions? In other words, is a probability concept contingent or emergent in
the logic of quantum propositions? Until this question is answered, the cause of probabilities
in quantum theory cannot be completely understood. In the present paper it is shown that the
interaction of the quantum system with its environment causes the irreducible randomness in
the relation between quantum propositions and truth values.
Keywords: Quantum mechanics; Closed linear subspaces; Lattice structures; Truth-value as-
signment; Supervaluationism; Quantum logic; Probabilistic logic
1 Introduction
According to the general belief, quantum mechanics is indeterministic [1], which implies that there
does not exist a definite value determining in advance the outcome of every experiment performed
on a quantum system.
And yet, attempts to treat indeterministically quantum propositions (i.e., ones whose truth values
can be determined with experiments on a quantum system) encounter some difficult questions.
To be sure, consider a quantum proposition denoted as P which is represented by a closed linear
subspace HP of a Hilbert space H associated with a quantum system. If the system is prepared in
the pure state |ΨP 〉 belonging to the subspace HP , then it is reasonable to assume that any valua-
tion (i.e., an assignment of truth values, true and false, to propositional variables) should assign the
value of true to the quantum proposition P . In symbols, this can be expressed as P (|ΨP 〉) 7→ true
(where P (|ΨP 〉) stands for “P in the state |ΨP 〉”). Similarly, in case that the system is prepared in
the pure state |Ψ⊥P 〉 residing in the subspace H⊥P ⊆ H orthogonal to HP , it is reasonable to assign
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the value of false to the proposition P ; in symbols, P (|Ψ⊥P 〉) 7→ false .
Now, suppose that the system is prepared in the pure state |ΨQ〉 lying in the closed linear subspace
HQ ⊆ H, which represents another quantum proposition Q so that Q(|ΨQ〉) 7→ true . Furthermore,
suppose that the subspace HQ is neither orthogonal nor co-aligned with the subspace HP , which
means that HQ * H⊥P and HQ + H⊥P as well as HQ * HP and HQ + HP .
Allowing that quantum propositions obey quantum logic of Birkhoff and von Neumann [2], one in-
fers that the conjunction of Q and P , i.e., C = Q∧P , must be always false and so C(|ΨQ〉) 7→ false.
This entails P (|ΨQ〉) 7→ false; hence, the set of events {P (|ΨQ〉) is true} must contain no elements.
However, according to Born’s rule, there are instances in which P is found out to be true when the
system is prepared in |ΨQ〉. So, the question is, how can a non-zero probability be assigned to the
empty set {P (|ΨQ〉) is true} without invalidating axioms of probability?
To avoid this question, one might assume – different from quantum logic – that in the state |ΨQ〉
the quantum proposition P is meaningless, i.e., without a truth value t∈ {true, false}, which can
be written down in symbols as P (|ΨQ〉) 67→ t. But then another question arises, namely, how does
one evaluate the probability measure µ(P (|ΨQ〉)) when the argument P (|ΨQ〉) has no truth value?
Put differently, how does the state |ΨQ〉 assign a probability-value to the quantum proposition P
without assigning it a truth-value first?
Consequently, the central question in probabilistic reasoning concerning quantum propositions is,
how do such propositions become associated with probabilities? In other words, what is random
about quantum propositions? Clearly, the origin of probabilities in quantum physics won’t be fully
understood until this question is answered.
The present paper shows that the interaction of the quantum system with its environment brings
about the irreducible randomness in the relation between quantum propositions and truth values.
2 Admissibility and the indefiniteness of valuation
Recall that a proposition is identified with the set of interpretations which make the proposition
true [3]. One can infer from this that the assignment of truth-values to a quantum proposition, say
P , can be defined by a predicate (or rule), namely,
P (|Ψ〉) = ΦP (|Ψ〉) , (1)
which means that all states of the quantum system |Ψ〉 satisfying the predicate ΦP render P true.
The predicate ΦP can be made precise. Let the system be prepared in the state |Ψ〉 residing in the
closed linear subspace H|Ψ〉 of the Hilbert space H and let HP ⊆ H be the closed linear subspace
that represents the quantum proposition P . Then P assumes the value of true or false in accordance
with the following rule
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ΦP : |Ψ〉 ∈ H|Ψ〉 ∧HP 7→ t ∈ {true, false} , (2)
where H|Ψ〉 ∧HP denotes the lattice-theoretic meet of the subspaces H|Ψ〉 and HP .
To see how this rule works, consider the Hilbert lattice L(H) imposed on all closed linear subspaces
of H.
Recall that closed linear subspaces, say, HA and HB, of a Hilbert space H are called commutable
if the following condition holds [4]:
HA ∩
(
HA ∩H⊥B
)⊥
⊆ HB , (3)
where ∩ denotes the set-theoretic intersection and (·)⊥ stands for the orthogonal complement of (·).
Suppose that H|Ψ〉 is co-aligned with HP such that H|Ψ〉 ⊆ HP . Then, H⊥|Ψ〉 ⊇ H⊥P , and so
H|Ψ〉 ∩ H⊥P = {0} which means that the condition (3) holds: H|Ψ〉 ∩ (H|Ψ〉 ∩ H⊥P )⊥ = H|Ψ〉 ⊆ HP .
At the same time, because H|Ψ〉∧HP = (H|Ψ〉 ∩HP ) = H|Ψ〉, in place of |Ψ〉 ∈ H|Ψ〉∧HP one finds
the expression |Ψ〉 ∈ H|Ψ〉 which is true under the initial condition. Hence,
ΦP : |Ψ〉 ∈ H|Ψ〉 7→ true , (4)
and, in accordance with (1), the quantum proposition P assumes the value of true in |Ψ〉 ∈ HP .
Next, suppose that H|Ψ〉 is orthogonal to HP and so H|Ψ〉 ∩HP = {0}. Let H|Ψ〉 ⊆ H⊥P ; this means
(H|Ψ〉∩H⊥P ) = H|Ψ〉, so the condition (3) is valid: H|Ψ〉∩ (H|Ψ〉∩H⊥P )⊥ = {0} ⊆ HP . If H|Ψ〉 ⊇ H⊥P ,
this condition is valid again: HP ∩ (HP ∩ H⊥|Ψ〉)⊥ = {0} ⊆ H|Ψ〉. On the other hand, because any
(physically meaningful) state |Ψ〉 differs from 0, it follows
ΦP : |Ψ〉 ∈ H|Ψ〉 ∧HP = {0} 7→ false , (5)
meaning that the quantum proposition P takes on the value of false in |Ψ〉 ∈ H⊥P .
Let H|Ψ〉 ⊇ HP ; so therefore, the condition (3) holds once again: HP ∩(HP ∩H⊥|Ψ〉)⊥ ⊆ H|Ψ〉. Using
(2) one finds that
ΦP : |Ψ〉 ∈
(H|Ψ〉 ∩HP ) = HP 7→
{
true, |Ψ〉 ∈ HP
false, |Ψ〉 /∈ HP , (6)
i.e., the quantum proposition P is true or false depending on whether or not the state |Ψ〉 lying in
H|Ψ〉 belongs to HP as well.
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Now, suppose that the closed linear subspaces H|Ψ〉 and HP do not commute, and, as a result, they
are neither orthogonal nor co-aligned. Notwithstanding this stipulation, the meet H|Ψ〉∧HP exists
even then because the Hilbert lattice L(H) is complete [5, 6]. What is more, in the lattice L(H)
this meet corresponds to the zero-dimensional subspace {0}. Consequently, one obtains that
ΦP : |Ψ〉 ∈
(H|Ψ〉 ∧HP ) = {0} 7→ false , (7)
i.e., the quantum proposition P assumes the value of false in the said case.
It follows from this analysis that within the structure of the Hilbert lattice L(H) quantum propo-
sitions can only be truth-value definite, which leaves no room for a random phenomenon.
A way to bring indefiniteness into a valuation of quantum propositions is to strengthen the rule (2)
by the additional requirement of admissibility. Specifically, one may demand that the predicate ΦP
will return a truth value only if ΦP is admissible in the state |Ψ〉; if it is not, then the quantum
proposition P should remain truth-value indefinite in |Ψ〉.
To formulate conditions of admissibility some preliminaries are in order first.
Recall that a closed linear subspace, say HP , of a Hilbert space H can be considered as a range of
some projection operator (i.e., self-adjoint idempotent operator), say Pˆ , acting on H. Explicitly,
the subspace HP is identical to the subset of the vectors |Ψ〉 ∈ H that are in the image of Pˆ :
HP ≡ ran(Pˆ ) =
{
|Ψ〉 ∈ H: Pˆ |Ψ〉 = |Ψ〉
}
. (8)
In the same way, the closed linear subspace orthogonal to HP is identical to the kernel of Pˆ , i.e.,
the subset of the vectors |Ψ〉 ∈ H that are mapped to zero by Pˆ , explicitly:
H⊥P ≡ ker(Pˆ ) = ran(1ˆ− Pˆ ) =
{
|Ψ〉 ∈ H: (1ˆ− Pˆ )|Ψ〉 = |Ψ〉
}
, (9)
where 1ˆ stands for the identity operator on H. For that reason, the projection operator 1ˆ− Pˆ can
be understood as the negation of Pˆ , i.e.,
¬Pˆ = 1ˆ− Pˆ . (10)
As consequences of (8) and (9), one has
ran(Pˆ ) ∩ ran(¬Pˆ ) = ran(0ˆ) = {0} , (11)
ran(Pˆ ) + ran(¬Pˆ ) = ran(1ˆ) = H , (12)
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where 0ˆ is the zero operator on H, while the subsets {0} and H are the trivial subspaces of H (which
correspond to the trivial projection operators 0ˆ and 1ˆ, respectively).
Recall that the set of two or more nontrivial projection operators PˆA, PˆB , . . . on H is called a
context Σ
Σ =
{
PˆA, PˆB , . . .
}
(13)
if the next requirements are satisfied:
PˆAPˆB = PˆBPˆA = 0ˆ , (14)
PˆA + PˆB + · · · =
∑
Pˆ∈Σ
Pˆ = 1ˆ . (15)
Let O = {Σ} be the set of all the contexts associated with the quantum system and let PA and PB
denote quantum propositions represented by ran(PˆA) and ran(PˆB) respectively. Then, the rule (2)
will be admissible for a valuation of PA and PB in |Ψ〉 if the following two conditions are applicable
for any Σ ∈ O [7]:
(i). if there is such PˆA ∈ Σ that PA(|Ψ〉) assumes the value of true, then PB(|Ψ〉) must be false
for all PˆB ∈ (Σ\{PˆA});
(ii). if there is such PˆA ∈ Σ that PB(|Ψ〉) assumes the value of false for all PˆB ∈ (Σ\{PˆA}), then
PA(|Ψ〉) must be true.
It is not difficult to see that the validity of the admissibility conditions relies on the mutual com-
mutability of the subspaces H|Ψ〉 and HP . Thus, if the contexts Σ|Ψ〉 and ΣP containing in that
order the projection operators |Ψ〉〈Ψ| and Pˆ are non-intertwined (meaning that Σ|Ψ〉 and ΣP do not
share common projection operators [8]), then the subspaces H|Ψ〉 = ran(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|) and HP = ran(Pˆ )
will be incommutable. According to the rule (2), this means that the quantum proposition P
should assume the value of false in the states |Ψ〉∈H|Ψ〉 for all Pˆ ∈ΣP . This violates the condition
(ii); consequently, the rule (2) should be considered inadmissible for a valuation of the quantum
proposition P in |Ψ〉∈H|Ψ〉, and so P should remain truth-value indefinite in these states.
However, be that as it might, one must not forget that the admissibility requirement is in fact
some extraneous supposition coming from outside the Hilbert space formalism. Another way to
put it is that admissibility is not belonging to the structure of the Hilbert lattice L(H). Hence, the
truth-value indefiniteness of quantum propositions introduced through admissibility is contingent
(not necessary existing) and, for this reason, cannot be considered intrinsic.
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3 Indefinite valuation in supervaluationism
An alternative way to introduce indefiniteness into a valuation of quantum propositions is to not
impose the structure of the Hilbert lattice L(H) on closed linear subspaces of a Hilbert space H.
To give details of this approach, recall first that a subspace HA ⊆ H is called an invariant subspace
under the projection operator PˆA on H if
Pˆ : HA →HA . (16)
This means that the image of every vector |ΨA〉 in HA under PˆA remains within HA which can be
denoted as
PˆAHA =
{
|ΨA〉 ∈ HA: PˆA|ΨA〉
}
⊆ HA . (17)
Let L(PˆA) refer to the set of the invariant subspaces of H invariant under the projection operator
PˆA:
L(PˆA) =
{
HA ⊆ H: PˆAHA ⊆ HA
}
. (18)
Consider the set L(Σ) of the invariant subspaces which are invariant under every projection operator
PˆA, PˆB , . . . from the context Σ:
L(Σ) = L(PˆA) ∩ L(PˆB) ∩ · · · =
⋂
Pˆ∈Σ
L(Pˆ ) . (19)
The elements of this set form a complete lattice called the invariant-subspace lattice of the context
Σ [9]. The lattice operations on L(Σ) are defined in an ordinary way: Specifically, the meet ∧ and
the join ∨ are defined by
HA,HB ∈ L(Σ) =⇒
{
HA ∧HB = HA ∩HB ∈ L(Σ)
HA ∨HB =
(
(HA)⊥ ∩ (HB)⊥
)⊥ ∈ L(Σ) . (20)
It is straightforward to verify that each invariant-subspace lattice L(Σ) contains only mutually
commuting subspaces (corresponding to mutually commutable projection operators), which means
that each L(Σ) is a Boolean algebra. It follows then that for all ran(PˆA), ran(PˆB) ∈ L(Σ), one has
ran(PˆA) ∧ ran(PˆB) = {0} ⇐⇒ PˆAPˆB = PˆBPˆA = 0ˆ , (21)
ran(PˆA) ∧ ran(PˆB) = ran(PˆA) ⇐⇒ PˆAPˆB = PˆBPˆA = PˆA , (22)
ran(PˆA) + ran(PˆB) + · · · = H ⇐⇒ PˆA + PˆB + · · · = 1ˆ . (23)
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Consider the collection of the lattices {L(Σ)}Σ∈O which is in one-to-one correspondence with the
set of all the contexts O associated with the quantum system. Since Pˆ{0} ⊆ {0} and PˆH ⊆ H
for all Pˆ ∈ O, the trivial subspaces {0} and H are elements of each invariant-subspace lattice from
{L(Σ)}Σ∈O.
If all the lattices from {L(Σ)}Σ∈O are pasted (stitched) together at their common elements – that
is, in any case, at the trivial subspaces {0} and H – then the resulted logic will be the Hilbert lattice
L(H). In this sense, the Hilbert lattice L(H) can be thought of as the pasting of the invariant-
subspace lattices from the collection {L(Σ)}Σ∈O. Providing the set of all the contexts O form a
continuum, the Hilbert lattice is a continuum of pasting of the Boolean algebras L(Σ) ∈ {L(Σ)}Σ∈O.
However, without such pasting construction, i.e., giving up the assumption of the Hilbert lattice,
the structure of {L(Σ)}Σ∈O results in the logic that can be identified as supervaluationism.
To be sure, recall that supervaluation semantics retains the classical consequence relation and
classical laws at the same time as admitting truth-value gaps [10, 11]. For example, according to
supervaluationism, a disjunction D = PB∨¬PB and a conjunction C = PB∧¬PB assume the value
of true and false, respectively, even when PB and ¬PB have no truth values at all (i.e., have truth
values gaps).
Assuming that the lattice-theoretic meet ∧ and join ∨ of commuting subspaces can be interpreted
as the conjunction and disjunction of the quantum propositions represented by those subspaces, one
finds that D and C must be represented by the trivial subspaces H and {0}, respectively, because
ran(PˆB) + ran(¬PˆB) = ran(PˆB) ∨ ran(¬PˆB) = H , (24)
ran(PˆB) ∧ ran(¬PˆB) = {0} , (25)
where the subspaces ran(PˆB) and ran(¬PˆB) represent the quantum proposition PB and its negation
¬PB. Next, it follows that in any pure state of the system, for example, |ΨA〉 ∈ ran(PˆA), the
predicates ΦD for D and ΦC for C return the values of true and false correspondingly:
ΦD: |ΨA〉 ∈
(
ran(PˆA) ∩H
)
= ran(PˆA) 7→ true , (26)
ΦC : |ΨA〉 ∈
(
ran(PˆA) ∩ {0}
)
= {0} 7→ false , (27)
so, the disjunction D is a tautology while the conjunction C is a contradiction.
On the other hand, if the projection operators PˆA and PˆB belong to the non-intertwined contexts
ΣA and ΣB, respectively, neither ran(PˆB) nor ran(¬PˆB) can be elements of the invariant-subspace
lattice L(ΣA) containing ran(PˆA). In the said case, not having the pasting construction of the
Hilbert lattice L(H) means that the lattice-theoretic meet ∧ cannot be defined on a pair of ran(PˆA)
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and ran(PˆB) as well as on a pair of ran(PˆA) and ran(¬PˆB) (recall that the meet is defined as an
operation on pairs of elements from one lattice [12]). Hence, in the states |ΨA〉 ∈ ran(PˆA), the
predicates ΦPB for PB and Φ¬PB for ¬PB cannot be determined and so return no truth value
(without a supplementary requirement of admissibility). In symbols,
PˆA, PˆB /∈ (ΣA ∩ΣB) =⇒ Φβ: |ΨA〉 ∈ ran(PˆA)✟✟∧ ran(βˆ) 67→ t , (28)
where β ∈ {PB ,¬PB}, βˆ ∈ {PˆB ,¬PˆB}, and the diagonal strikeout of ∧ indicates that the meet
operation cannot be defined. In consequence, the quantum proposition PB and its negation ¬PB
are indefinite (i.e., “gappy”) in the states |ΨA〉 ∈ ran(PˆA), although their disjunction D and con-
junction C have truth values in these states.
As one can see, the aforesaid truth-value indefiniteness is proper to the structure of {L(Σ)}Σ∈O
and accordingly can be regarded as intrinsic.
To elucidate how “gappy” quantum propositions become associated with probabilities in {L(Σ)}Σ∈O,
consider the following simple model.
4 A two-state model for probabilities
Let a qubit – i.e., a two-state quantum-mechanical system (such as a one-half spin particle, say, an
electron) – which is denoted as S, interact with its environment E described by a collection of N
other qubits.
Suppose that each environmental qubit has the preferred set of states (say, due to the design of the
experiment) corresponding to the eigenvalues +1 and −1 of the Pauli matrix σz, namely,
{|Ψkz+〉, |Ψkz−〉} ≡
{[
1
0
]
,
[
0
1
]}
, (29)
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Correspondingly, the Hilbert space of the kth environmental qubit Hk is
Hk = ran(1ˆ) =
∑
β=±
ran(Pˆkzβ) , (30)
where Pˆkz± are the projection operators of spin along the z-axis.
Also suppose that, in contrast to the environmental qubits, the qubit S has no preferred states and
so the Hilbert space HS of the qubit S can be presented as
HS = ran(1ˆ) =
∑
α=±
ran(PˆSu′α) =
∑
α=±
ran(PˆSu′′α) = . . . , (31)
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where u′, u′′, · · · ∈ R3 are arbitrary axes.
Since for all u′ 6= u′′ the projection operators PˆSu′± and PˆSu′′± belong to the different contexts,
namely, ΣSu′ and ΣSu′′ , the subspaces ran(PˆSu′±) and ran(PˆSu′′±) cannot be elements of one
invariant-subspace lattice. So, within the structure of the collection {L(ΣSu′),L(ΣSu′′), . . . }, the
quantum propositions “Spin of the qubit S along the u′′-axis is ± ~
2
”, denoted as PSu′′± and repre-
sented by the subspaces ran(PˆSu′′±), are undetermined in any of the states |ΨSu′±〉 ∈ ran(PˆSu′±).
In symbols,
ΦSu′′±: |ΨSu′±〉 ∈ ran(PˆSu′±)✟✟∧ ran(PˆSu′′±) 67→ t , (32)
where ΦSu′′± are the predicates for PSu′′±.
After the interaction between the qubit S and its environment E, the Hilbert space of the composite
system SE becomes the tensor product
HSE = ran(1ˆ) = HS
N⊗
k=1
Hk , (33)
or, explicitly,
HSE =
∑
β=±
. . .

∑
β=±

∑
β=±
HS ⊗ ran(Pˆ1zβ)

⊗ ran(Pˆ2zβ)

 · · · ⊗ ran(PˆNzβ) . (34)
One can observe from this that at some k along the chain HS
⊗N
k=1Hk (providing N is large
enough) the subspaces ran(PˆSu′±) and ran(PˆSu′′±) will be factors of tensor products belonging to
a common invariant-subspace lattice imposed on the subspaces of HSE.
For the sake of simplicity, assume that this happens at k = 1, i.e.,
HSE = ran(1ˆ) =
(∑
α=±
ran(PˆSu′α)
)
⊗ ran(Pˆ1z+) +
(∑
α=±
ran(PˆSu′′α)
)
⊗ ran(Pˆ1z−) . (35)
In the invariant-subspace lattice L(Σ) of the context Σ associated with SE, namely,
Σ =
{
PˆSu′+⊗ Pˆ1z− , PˆSu′−⊗ Pˆ1z− , PˆSu′′+⊗ Pˆ1z+ , PˆSu′′−⊗ Pˆ1z+
}
, (36)
the subspaces ran(PˆSu′±) and ran(PˆSu′′±) are pasted together, that is,
ran(PˆSu′±)⊗ ran(Pˆ1z−) , ran(PˆSu′′±)⊗ ran(Pˆ1z+) ∈ L(Σ) . (37)
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So, the quantum propositions “Spin of the qubit S along the u′′-axis is ± ~
2
AND spin of the
environmental qubit along the z-axis is + ~
2
”, denoted as logical conjunctions PSu′′± ∧ P1z+ and
represented by the tensor products ran(PˆSu′′±)⊗ ran(Pˆ1z+), are determined in the states
|ΨSu′±〉|Ψ1z−〉 ∈ ran(PˆSu′±)⊗ ran(Pˆ1z−) , (38)
where |a〉|b〉 stands, as it is customary, for the tensor product |a〉⊗ |b〉. Concretely, since
ran(PˆSu′±)⊗ ran(Pˆ1z−) ∧ ran(PˆSu′′±)⊗ ran(Pˆ1z+) = {0} , (39)
the predicates ΦSu′′±∧ 1z+ for logical conjunctions PSu′′± ∧ P1z+ are:
ΦSu′′±∧ 1z+: |ΨSu′±〉|Ψ1z−〉 ∈ {0} 7→ false , (40)
which, in accordance with (1), means that PSu′′±∧P1z+ assume the value of false in |ΨSu′±〉|Ψ1z−〉.
The fact that the environmental qubits have the preferred set of states {|Ψkz+〉, |Ψkz−〉} implies
that the quantum proposition “Spin of the environmental qubit along the z-axis is + ~
2
”, denoted
as P1z+ and represented by ran(Pˆ1z+), is false in the composite states |ΨSu′±〉|Ψ1z−〉 describing the
entanglement between S and E.
As PSu′′±∧P1z+ and P1z+ are definite in these states, it makes sense to say that the quantum
propositions PSu′′+ and PSu′′− have a truth-value there [13, 14]. Besides, since in these states
PSu′′± ∧ P1z+ and P1z+ are all false, the quantum propositions PSu′′+ and PSu′′− may yield the
value of true as well as the value of false in the said states, i.e.,
PSu′′±(|ΨSu′±〉|Ψ1z−〉) 7→ {true, false} . (41)
By reason of this, the result of a collection of experiments intended to determine a truth value of
PSu′′+ or PSu′′− in |ΨSu′±〉|Ψ1z−〉 cannot be predicted (based on the knowledge of the state of the
system) and is expected to be a distribution describing the numbers of times the values “true” and
“false” are determined.
Considering that the conjunctions C± = PSu′′±∧ ¬PSu′′± are false in any state and ¬PSu′′± =
PSu′′∓, one finds that the intersection of the events E1 = {PSu′′+(|ΨSu′±〉|Ψ1z−〉) is true} and
E2 = {PSu′′−(|ΨSu′±〉|Ψ1z−〉) is true}, namely, E1∩ E2 = {C+(|ΨSu′±〉|Ψ1z−〉) is true}, must contain
no elements, meaning that E1 and E2 must be mutually exclusive. This entails the sum rule:
Pr[E1 ∪ E2] = Pr[E1] + Pr[E2] , (42)
10
where Pr[·] denotes the probability of an event. On the other hand, since the disjunction D =
PSu′′+∨ PSu′′− is true in any state, the union of the events E1 ∪ E2 = {D(|ΨSu′±〉|Ψ1z−〉) is true}
must be the entire sample space, and therefore Pr[E1 ∪ E2] = 1.
Given that the states |ΨSu′±〉 can be presented as superpositions of the states |ΨSu′′±〉 ∈ ran(PˆSu′′±)
with the coefficients having equal norms, namely,
|ΨSu′±〉 = 1√
2
(|ΨSu′′+〉 ± |ΨSu′′−〉) , (43)
one can apply the principle of indifference and infer that PSu′′±(|ΨSu′±〉|Ψ1z−〉) are equally likely
to come out true, that is, Pr[E1] = Pr[E2] = 12 .
5 Conclusion remarks
The main idea underlying probabilistic reasoning about quantum propositions is rather simple.
Let {P,Q, . . . } denote the set of all quantum propositions relating to a quantum system and let b
stand for the bivaluation [15], i.e., the assignment of truth-values t ∈ {true, false} to those quantum
propositions in the state |Ψ〉, namely,
b: {P (|Ψ〉), Q(|Ψ〉), . . . } 7→ {true, false} . (44)
In this framework, the image of the quantum proposition P in |Ψ〉 under b is written as b(P (|Ψ〉)).
Using 1 for true and 0 for false, one can interpret the function b as the dispersion-free probability
measure µ such that the probability of P (|Ψ〉) being verified is given by
Pr [P (|Ψ〉) is true] = µ (P (|Ψ〉)) . (45)
Drawing the inference from µ(P (|Ψ〉)) ∈ {0, 1} one can put µ(P (|Ψ〉)) ∈ [0, 1] as a general principle
bringing in this way the logic of quantum propositions to a form of probabilistic reasoning based on
the Hilbert space formalism. There is an extensive body of literature demonstrating this approach
and its variations, see papers [16], [17], [18], to name but a few.
Even though the derivation of µ(P (|Ψ〉)) from b(P (|Ψ〉)) (according to which µ(P (|Ψ〉)) can be
regarded as a probabilistic truth value) may seem unquestionable from the mathematical point of
view, it does not explain how a probability concept appears in the bivaluation of quantum propo-
sitions. That is, whence come probabilities in the logic of quantum propositions?
The simple model of the qubit interacting with N other qubits, demonstrated in the present paper,
motivates the following answer to this question.
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Given that under realistic circumstances the environment E has an enormous number of degrees
of freedom, incommutable ranges of projection operators belonging to different contexts of nearly
every quantum system S are expected to be pasted together in a common invariant-subspace lat-
tice of a context associated with the composite system SE formed after the inevitable interaction
between S and E.
On the other hand, according to the stability criterion [19], the environment E (composed of envi-
ronmental systems) must have the preferred set of states, in which the correlation between any two
environmental systems is left undisturbed by the subsequent formation of correlations with other
systems of E. Invoking this criterion, one finds that in one and the same pure state describing the
entanglement between S and E, a quantum proposition relating to S may assume the value of true
as much as false. Since one cannot predict the truth value of this proposition, one introduces the
probability that the proposition in the said state will be verified.
In this sense, the irreducible randomness appearing in the bivaluation of quantum propositions (i.e.,
randomness which is not related to the uncertainty in the state of the system [20]) is environmen-
tally induced. Otherwise stated, the interaction between the quantum system and its environment
brings on probabilities in the logic of quantum propositions.
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